# Negative

### 1nc – regulations fail

#### It is impossible to fully and safely regulate complex AI

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Recalling the realist viewpoint of the political sphere, it seems that the only attainable goal is a modus vivendi, which resonates with the idea that an inherent characteristic of the political world is balancing the possibilities of two extremes. History of politics supports this more pessimistic view: occasionally, eruptions of civil war and failed states still embody the brute reality of the Hobbesian state of nature, while the existence of authoritarian and totalitarian dictatures altogether with hybrid regimes are eternal reminders of the impossibility to limit power in a once-and-for-all manner. In light of this reality of the political world, new claims for the regulation of artificial intelligence, more specifically on weak AI, are less promising. Debates on the regulation of AI concentrate on the need to connect principles such as fairness, accountability, safety, sustainability, and social inclusion, among others, to AI governance (for a more exhaustive list, see Hagendorff 2020). Nevertheless, the most discussed issue is transparency, which is among the primary claims for several AI 38 ethics guidelines released by different institutions and companies in the past few years. The current boom in ethical guidelines for AI involves several criticisms concerning the effectiveness of such guidelines based on their potential to implement transparency and other claims effectively. This line of criticism can be divided into three types of argument. The first type challenges the AI guidelines on their extensive list of ethical claims based on their ineffectiveness. This type, which can be called ‘tick-box criticism,’ can be coupled with a proposal of some different approach, for example, virtue ethics (see Hagendorff 2020). The second type, which can be called ‘double standard criticism’, is more sceptical about the possibility of guiding AI and whether full transparency can be achieved at all. This criticism builds on the argument that it would be a double standard to call for higher transparency in AI compared to human decision tools and human reasoning (see Zerilli et al. 2019). The third type of criticism is more focused, what we call ‘specificity criticism’, and argues that current Artificial Intelligence Guidelines (AIGUs) are not specific to AI, but they are simply attempting to gain social control over technology. This criticism also demonstrates that transparency and explainability are claims that specifically concern AI because in such cases there is a possibility of the autonomy of AI. In that case, though, the double standard problem arises (see Héder 2020). These criticisms imply that there is a profoundly political characteristic of AI. On the one hand, there is a relative autonomy inherent in AI that can be understood in a broader sense. It is impossible to regulate in every detail, something that can develop by itself. On the other hand, concerning the expert systems of weak AI, the double standard criticism and specificity criticism correctly acknowledged that it would be an unfair expectation to regulate the decision-making of artificial intelligence in domains where human decision-making cannot be entirely regulated likewise. However, contrary to the double standard criticism, we do not base our argument on the similarity between the obscurity of artificial decision tools and human cognitive processes. Instead, we build our argument on the political characteristic of AI. Using AI as a tool is similar to political authorization: although accountability is the main virtue in politics, it would be unrealistic to expect legislative, executive, or judicial officials to act ‘perfectly’. We can only hope that they behave to the best of their knowledge, and while we usually hold them to account for significant breaches of their power, mostly, we authorize them because authorization is the only legitimate way to create order without slipping into a Hobbesian state of nature or a tyrannical regime.

### 1nc – dod fails

#### DoD needs huge reforms before it could be effective

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Currently, there are no shared technical standards for what constitutes ethical or trustworthy AI systems, which can make it difficult for nontraditional AI vendors to set expectations and navigate the bureaucracy. The DoD is not directly responsible for setting standards. Rather, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) mission “to include advancing collaborative frameworks, standards, guidelines for AI, supporting the development of a risk mitigation framework for AI systems, and supporting the development of technical standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems.”7979. Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf. In July 2021, the NIST issued a request for information from stakeholders as it develops its AI Risk Management Framework, meant to help organizations “incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.”8080. “Summary Analysis of Responses to the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)—Request for Information (RFI),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 15, 2021, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/15/AI%20RMF\_RFI%20Summary%20.pdf. Related to standards are the challenges linked to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation (TEVV). Testing and verification processes are meant to “help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabling systems,” and are essential for building trust in AI.8181 Michele A. Flournoy, Avril Haines, and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing: Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems,” WestExec, October 2020, 3–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf. The **DoD’s current TEVV protocols and infrastructure are meant primarily for major defense acquisition** programs like ships, airplanes, or tanks; it is linear, sequential, and, ultimately, finite once the program transitions to production and deployment. **With AI systems, however, “development is never really finished, so neither is testing**.”8282. Flournoy, Haines, and Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing,” 3. Adaptive, continuously learning emerging technologies like AI, therefore, require a more agile and iterative development-and-testing approach—one that, as the NSCAI recommended, “integrates testing as a continuous part of requirements specification, development, deployment, training, and maintenance and includes run-time monitoring of operational behavior.”8383. “Final ,” 384. The ethical code that guides the US military reflects a fundamental commitment to abiding with the laws of war at a time when authoritarian countries like China and Russia show little regard for human rights and humanitarian principles. Concurrently, the DoD’s rigorous approach to testing and assurance of new capabilities is designed to ensure that new weapons are used responsibly and appropriately, and to minimize the risk from accidents, misuse, and abuse of systems and capabilities that can have dangerous, or even catastrophic, effects. These values and principles that the United States shares with many of its allies and partners are a strategic asset in the competition against authoritarian countries as they field AI-enabled military systems. To cement the DoD’s advantage in this arena, we recommend the following steps**.** The DoD will not be able to fulfill its ambitions in AI and compete effectively with the Chinese model of sourcing technology innovation through military- civil fusion without close partnerships with a broad range of technology companies. This includes defense-industry leaders with long-standing ties to the Pentagon, technology giants at the forefront of global innovation, commercial technology players seeking to expand their government portfolio, and startups at the cutting edge of AI development**. But, the DoD’s budget-planning, procurement, acquisition, contracting, and compliance processes will likely need to be fundamentally restructured to effectively engage with the entirety of this vibrant and diverse technology ecosystem. Systemic change is a slow, arduous process**. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts. The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”88 Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training. Rather than building entirely new AI-enabled systems, in the short to medium term, the DoD will be integrating AI into a range of existing software and hardware systems—from cyberdefense architectures to fighter jets to C2. Progress toward implementing AI will, therefore, also depend upon streamlining collaboration between the startups and nontraditional AI vendors that the DoD has been courting for their innovative and cutting-edge technologies and the defense primes responsible for integrating new capabilities into legacy systems.

### 1nc – russia AI fails

#### Russia lags behind in AI, means they aren’t a threat

Polyakova ’18(Alina,  President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as an adjunct professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), “Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare, Accessed 7/9/2022, brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/)

Speaking to Russian students on the first day of the school year in September 2017, Putin squarely positioned Russia in the technological arms race for artificial intelligence (AI). Putin’s comment (see above) signaled that, like China and the United States, Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on. But, unlike the United Statesand China**,** Russia lags behind in research and development on AI and other emerging technologies. Russia’s economy makes up less than 2 percent of global GDP compared to 24 percent for the United States and 15 percent for China, which puts Russia on par with a country like Spain.[[3]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-3) Despite Putin’s focus on AI, the Russian government has not released a strategy, like China has, on how the country plans to lead in this area. The Russian government’s future investment in AI research is unknown, but reports estimate that it spends approximately $12.5 million a year[[4]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-4) on AI research, putting it far behind China’s plan to invest $150 billion through 2030. The U.S. Department of Defense alone spends $7.4 billion annually on unclassified research and development on AI and related fields.[[5]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-5) Russia’s public corruption, decline in rule-of-law, and increasingly oppressive government regulations have produced a poor business environment. As a consequence, the country trails the United States and China in terms of private investment, scientific research, and the number of AI start-ups.[[6]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-6) In 2018, no Russian city entered the top 20 global regional hubs for the AI sector,[[7]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-7) despite the much-hyped opening of the “Skolkovo Innovation Center” in 2010, which was designed to be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Unlike Silicon Valley, Skolkovo did not spur the kind of private investments and innovation that the Kremlin had hoped for and has since fizzled out. Russia’s new venture, a “technopolis” named Era, which is set to open in the fall of 2018, now promises to be the new hub for emerging technologies, but it too is unlikely to spur Silicon Valley like innovation.[[8]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-8) It is telling that despite high-level presidential and administrative support, there is scant Russian language academic research on AI. It is not likely that the country’s stagnant and hydrocarbon-dependent economy will do much to improve the government’s ability to ramp up investment in emerging technologies. In the longer term, Russia’s demographic crisis (Russia is projected to lose 8 percent of its population by 2050, according the UN)[[9]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-9) will likely lead to shortages in highly skilled workers, many of whom have already left Russia for better pay and opportunities elsewhere.[[10]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-10) Western sanctions on key sectors of the Russian financial sector and defense industry, which Europe and the United States imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the United States has continued to ramp up since then, put extra pressure on the Russian economy. Taken together, the economic and demographic trends signal that in the AI race, Russia will be unable to match China on government investment or compete with the United States on private sector innovation. The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware of the country’s unfavorable position in the global AI competition, even if such an admission is unlikely to ever be made publicly. Strategically, such a wide gap between ambition and capacity means that Russia will need to invest its limited resources carefully. Currently, Moscow is pursuing investments in at least two directions: select conventional military and defense technologies where the Kremlin believes it can still hold comparative advantage over the West and high-impact, low-cost asymmetric warfare to correct the imbalance between Russia and the West in the conventional domain. The former—Russia’s development and use of AI-driven military technologies and weapons—has received significant attention.[[11]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-11) The latter—the implications of AI for asymmetric political warfare—remains unexplored.[[12]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/#footnote-12) Yet, such nonconventional tools—cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, political influence, and illicit finance—have become a central tenet of Russia’s strategy toward the West and one with which Russia has been able to project power and influence beyond its immediate neighborhood. In particular, AI has the potential to hyperpower Russia’s use of disinformation—the intentional spread of false and misleading information for the purpose of influencing politics and societies. And unlike in the conventional military space, the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) in the information space.